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This policy report provides an overview of Turkey’s development and humanitarian approaches in the 
territories of Somalia. For the past three decades, Turkey has been an active participant in multilateral peace 
efforts in a diversity of conflict-affected states such as Bosnia, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Traditionally Turkey 
has offered assistance to peacekeeping and military initiatives particularly through the United Nations and 
NATO. Since early 2000, however, Turkey’s approach to conflict-affected countries has shifted away from 
being primarily military to an increasingly civilian capacity focus. In its role as an emerging power, Turkey 
has stepped onto the development platform long dominated by “Western” donors. This shift reflects the 
change in foreign policy under the guidance of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s visionary leadership. As 
a majority Muslim state that is emboldened with a pluralistic democratic constitution, Turkey has resisted 
aspects of the traditional Western framework. Instead, civilian development actors have been engaged in a 
hybrid model through which Turkey’s own unique global perspective and positioning is reflected. There is 
growing international interest in Turkey’s regional leadership and in particular, its influence upon the Horn of 
Africa. This report analyzes Turkey’s development efforts in Somalia and investigates its alternative strategy 
for working within a stagnant conflict-affected state.
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Executive Summary
This report concludes that
• Turkey needs to continue clarifying and 
formalizing its development vision and goals for 
Somalia.
• Although efficient delivery of aid is highly valued 
by Turkish actors, they must ensure consistent 
coordination and communicate their intentions 
more effectively with other international actors 
and relevant institutions. Otherwise, they risk 
undermining their development efforts and 
contributing to the country’s war economy. 
Turkish officials are aware of this need and are 
currently drafting a development strategy in 
consultation with several civil society actors and 
the UNDP. The final policy brief should set out 
clear steps to institutionalize coordination with 
international donors and Somali actors. 
• Turkish officials should engage with traditional 
donors not only in coordinating aid and policies 
towards Somalia but also to gain a wider 
understanding of past mistakes made by the 
international community. Lessons learned and 
best practices will enhance and strengthen 
Turkey’s projects.
• Somalia is a deeply divided state. Aid and 
development are never neutral resources in 
fragile contexts. Turkey needs to institutionalize 
conflict-sensitive practices into all aspects of 
its policies and projects in the country. Such 
institutionalization will not necessarily decrease 
the creative initiatives and implementation of 
agencies such as TIKA but instead enhance 
efficiency and good development practice. 
• During the 2011 famine, harmonization between the 
Turkish state and the NGO community’s policies 
was at its highest. Leaders recognize the benefits 
of coordination and are currently developing a 
flexible strategy that will institutionalize these 
relationships while at the same time respecting 
the necessary independence of NGO efforts. This 
is an endeavor that should be supported.
• In contrast to other international donors, Turkey 
has tried to engage with Al-Shaabab and NGO 
workers implementing humanitarian projects 
in Al-Shaabab areas. This is a policy area that 
needs careful reflection in implementation. A 
high majority of people needing humanitarian 
assistance are in Al-Shaabab controlled areas. 
Turkish and Somali officials must be careful 
that assistance carried out in these conflicted-
affected regions is not misused by jihadists.
• Youth is the most significant demographic in 
Somalia. Turkish initiatives have featured a 
number of projects benefitting this group. These 
efforts should be extended and broadened 
across the country and include a particular focus 
on the rehabilitation of former combatants.
• While Turkish policies have had success in a 
number of areas, more focus must be placed on 
economic initiatives. Piracy, aid, and remittances 
are the most significant sources of finances for 
much of the country’s population. Turkey, in 
conjunction with other actors, should begin to 
consider this aspect of development.
• The Somali diaspora is a significant resource that 
offers the potential to benefit or contribute to the 
country’s ongoing conflict. Since its intervention 
in 2011, Turkey has enjoyed significant support 
by various cleavages of the diaspora. Turkey and 
other international donors should incorporate 
diaspora groups into policy initiatives as a means 
of engendering Somali empowerment and 
countering more malign forces exacerbating the 
conflict.
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Introduction
The increasingly complex and contradictory 
changes that have occurred during the first 
decade of the 21st century have, by their very 
nature, challenged the way development aid is 
conceptualized and delivered. The inauguration 
of the Millennium Development Goals and the 
inspiring hope that this global initiative brought to 
the developing world was soon overshadowed by 
the heightened securitization of aid that followed 
9/111 and security, which is now embedded 
in many countries' assistance frameworks, 
continues to dictate the financing and autonomy 
of development aid.2 Against this backdrop 
assistance, discussions are increasingly dominated 
by the emergence of non-DAC countries - an 
ambiguous label which includes a wide range of 
countries such as China, Brazil, Turkey and South 
Korea.3 The extent and diversity of these states' 
activities is hard to quantify given that they do 
not adhere to the reporting practices of traditional 
DAC countries.4 However, what is undeniable, is 
the creation of an alternative aid dynamic that has 
shifted away from traditional donor protocol. By 
snubbing the reporting duties and conditionality of 
these donors, emerging countries have begun to 
provide a legitimate alternative to the tainted goals 
and policies of the West. The dispersion of power 
to regional actors is illustrated by the willingness 
of emerging countries to engage with states that 
have been isolated because of Western security 
concerns. 
It is within the context of this complex mosaic of 
development actors and security challenges that 
attention turns to the role of pervasive conflict 
in the most persistently underdeveloped states, 
ostensibly categorized as “fragile states” and 
“least developed states.”
Although the label of “fragile states” originated 
outside the development community in the 
wake,of 9/115, the 2011 World Bank report is lauded 
for highlighting development deficits in conflict- 
affected countries6.
The g7+ group of self-identified fragile states now 
occupies this specific aid category7. Fragile states 
are considered the most unstable and vulnerable 
states to conflict, all of whom have failed to 
achieve a single MDG. Conflict has inevitably been 
a significant influence on traditional development 
trajectories, but has only recently begun to gain 
traction among development aid practitioners.8 
In the 1990s, the international community was 
confronted with a multitude of civil and ethnic 
wars that both international legal norms and the 
donor system were unable to address. Decades 
of ideological and state-centric aid in the post-
colonial and cold war eras had been followed by 
the decentralized project-based aid of the good 
governance agenda9, none of which considered 
the internal dynamics and competition that foreign 
aid can elicit. Aid is rarely neutral; more often, the 
politicization of aid creates winners and losers. 
The predictability of this dynamic was particularly 
evident in the aftermath of Rwanda’s genocide10. 
In the wake of this horrific event, a vast literature 
on different conflict-sensitive approaches began 
to address the potential effect of development 
assistance at the local and national levels.11 This is 
exemplified in works such as Kenneth Bush's “Peace 
and Conflict Impact Assessment” (PCIA), and Mary 
Anderson‘s “Do No Harm.”12 Concern regarding 
the relationship between aid and conflict has since 
created an industry of conflict-analysis methods, 
trainers and programs. It also perpetuated the trend 
of bureaucratic heavy aid13. The recent inclusion 
of fragile states into development language is 
a reflection of the growing security awareness 
of donors but also of terminology that is fueling 
ambiguity regarding aid categorization.
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The increased activity of emerging donor states 
is therefore met with apprehension among many 
traditional actors but optimistically by conflict-
affected states because these new assistance 
actors offer an alternative to the status quo. 
Ethical questions pervade discussions of emerging 
donors such as China14 regarding transparency and 
the principles of non-interference, particularly with 
abusive regimes. Yet these actors offer a method 
of engagement that presents them on an equal par 
with Western donors and offers opportunities for 
new perspectives. Their efforts are supplemented 
through bilateral technical cooperation which is 
quite contrary to the conditionality that so often 
fosters resentment from recipient states15. For 
example, emerging states may buck the regulatory 
and reporting guidelines of traditional DAC donors 
but such isolation also allows these states, many 
of whom have recently graduated from ODA, to 
pursue south-south cooperation without the stigma 
of association with decades of failed development 
policies. Several of the precedents and trends 
established in the 2005 Paris Declaration, ACCRA 
200816 and the “New Deal” at Busan in 201117 have 
been adhered to by emerging states although not 
publicly championed. These new development 
actors have been relatively cooperative and 
transparent, yet their voice and legitimacy in 
the South has been persistently scrutinized and 
questioned. As all international actors weigh 
their national strategies with that of development 
and peacebuilding agendas, problems over 
harmonization of aid programs will likely continue18. 
Despite continued issues of transparency and 
ethical concerns, the opportunities for cooperation 
and creation of complimentary projects through bi-
lateral or triangular cooperation are considerable. 
With the deadline for the MDGs looming, this is 
an auspicious time to create a more equitable and 
inclusive approach for aid assistance to developing 
and conflict-affected countries.
Turkey’s Foreign Policy and Development 
Agenda
The post-9/11 international system is one that 
is characterized by anti-western terrorism, 
Islamaphobia, the weakening of NATO, and a 
diffuse UN consensus. The effects of wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq have generated significant 
reverberations within the region and throughout 
the global community. Turkey's geostrategic 
position has traditionally marked the country as 
the bulwark between East and West, especially 
during the Cold War19. But of increasing importance 
today is Turkey's cultural identity as a modern 
state with a parliamentary democracy, a secular 
constitution, and a majoritarian Muslim population. 
These unique characteristics have positioned 
Turkey as a multi-dimensional actor between the 
hinges of the Middle East, the Balkans, and the 
Caucasus. The impact of geopolitics, modernity, 
and democracy has brought shape to the central 
values underlying Turkey's foreign policy and the 
source of its soft power.20 It is within this context 
that Turkey has emerged as a pivotal state in 
world affairs. Despite global downturns, Turkey 
has enjoyed unprecedented economic growth in 
the last decade, making it the 17th largest economy 
in the world.21 Political leaders have since stepped 
onto the international stage by becoming accepted 
regional mediators and the fourth largest donor of 
humanitarian assistance in the world – particularly 
in the Balkans and Middle East.22 
A strong tradition has emanated from the 
Ottoman era of state and private philanthropy for 
development projects and services such as schools, 
hospitals, and mosques.23 This understanding 
of constructive development is one that is still 
prevalent among many Turkish agencies and civil 
society actors. Turkey's NGO community has been 
growing in size and activism since the mid-1990s 
after the relaxation of many of the laws and social 
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restrictions that had impeded civil society activity. 
The Bosnian war and the expanding violence in the 
Balkans was a key influence on the emergence of 
humanitarian NGOs in Turkey24 and the increasing 
mobilization of the Turkish state's humanitarian 
activities, which also sought to reestablish its 
cultural, economic, and political ties with the 
region.25 Similarly the independence of the Turkic 
states of Central Asia after the fall of the Soviet 
Union ignited the desire for closer relations and 
mutual assistance that has only in recent years 
come to fruition.26 These events provoked a more 
assertive shift in Turkey’s foreign assistance. Turkey, 
as a recipient of Official Development Aid (ODA) 
since multiparty rule began in the 1950s, was 
significantly influenced by both its experience as an 
aid recipient and internal strife with its minorities. 
Beginning with the transition in the 1980s, Turkey 
first began to re-orientate and increase its 
international activity. Officials promoted forms 
of “assistance” which reflected dual emphasis 
on state security and economic development. It 
initially targeted neighboring countries where 
there was a long heritage of historical and cultural 
ties.27 Reflecting this increasing commitment to 
development assistance, the Turkish Cooperation 
and Coordination Agency (TİKA) was established 
in 1992. Under the governance of the AKP, TİKA's 
portfolio has since been diversified and expanded to 
include the Caucasus, South Asia, and of increasing 
prominence, Africa. It now works in 100 countries 
and has 33 Programme Coordination Offices 
in 30 cooperation partner countries.28 Turkey's 
commitment to proactive development assistance 
and systematic cooperation with international 
actors is evidenced by its participation in the UNDP 
South-South Cooperation (SSC)29 and its initiatives 
with Least Developed Countries.30
In the past three decades, Turkey has been active 
in participating with international initiatives in a 
diversity of conflict-affected states such as Bosnia, 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Somalia. 
Traditionally Turkey has offered assistance in 
peacekeeping and other military initiatives, 
starting with the Korean War, where it provided 
the 4th largest contingent.31 After the Cold War, 
Turkey assumed a number of roles such as a UN 
observer following the 1988-1991 Iran-Iraq war, and 
providing military leadership during the UNOSOM 
II operation in Somalia in 1993. Additionally, Turkey 
made significant contributions to the stabilization 
of Kosovo and Bosnia by deploying both military 
and civilian police. However, since early 2000, 
Turkey's approach to conflict-affected countries 
has shifted away from being primarily military to 
an increasingly civilian capacity focus. This shift 
reflects the change in foreign policy under the 
guidance of its chief architect Ahmet Davutoğlu, 
who has promoted a pragmatic multilateral 
foreign policy that strives for a balance between 
proactive or “visionary” foreign policy and 
crisis management.32 The importance of human 
rights, which previously had been rhetorically 
emphasized, has now become central to Turkey’s 
foreign policy practices under the terminology of 
“humanitarian diplomacy.” In its evolving role as 
a regional mediator, Turkey continues to wrestle 
with the difficult and fragile balance between 
respecting the sovereignty of states while also 
protecting the security and needs of citizens – a 
tension that is particularly relevant to its efforts in 
Syria and Somalia in 2011-2013.33
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Somalia Case Study 
Over 30 years of conflict and insecurity have 
persistently destabilized Somalia. Waves of famines, 
internal displacement, terrorist activities, and an 
ineffectual central government has fragmented 
the country into the sub political and territorial 
entities of Puntland, Somalialand, Galmudug State, 
Jubaland, and the South Central region of the 
Federal Government of Somalia. In the two decades 
since the fall of the Barre regime, both Puntland 
and Somalialand have largely been able to escape 
the periodic humanitarian crises that has plagued 
the rest of the country, and remained peaceful and 
stable. Isolated from the global banking networks, 
agriculture serves as the basis for the country’s 
informal cash economy.34 With fertile land in the 
South and significant fisheries and natural resources 
such as gas and oil in the North, Somalia’s potential 
for self-sufficiency is high. It has also cultivated a 
significant and powerful diaspora35 that have the 
paradoxical potential to help lift the country out 
of its strife or to feed into the Islamist insurgency 
threatening the nation. 
Somalia is at a precarious moment. It stands 
at a threshold of either building on positive 
developments such as renewed international 
engagement in the country and re-opened talks 
with Puntland and Somaliland36 or sinking back 
into the historical and chaotic patterns of clan 
rivalry and Jihadist warfare that have thrived in an 
environment of structural insecurity and poverty.
Short History of War Torn Somalia  
The complexity of Somali society and its 
geostrategic position has been a source of 
Somalia’s enduring independence and its disunity. 
Continuous fragility has been exacerbated by 
decades of internal conflicts as well as international 
aid intervention strategies. Somali clan affiliation, 
the dominant form of social organization and 
protection, is a critical factor in the country’s 
persistent discord. Clanism is a product of the 
territory’s vast geography, the nomadic nature of the 
country’s agriculture-based economy, colonialism, 
and a deep distrust of a centralized state. During 
the scramble for Africa, the Horn succeeded in 
retaining significant autonomy under the colonial 
administration of Italy who governed the area 
of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and what is now considered 
Somalia. Like many forms of colonialism, however, 
the presence of a possessive foreign power and its 
invasive societal impact heightened ethnic identity 
and clan associations. These affiliations became 
a significant support for survival; the strength of 
these ties persists today. 
The nature of clan lineage is also embedded in 
specific Islamic practices that have developed in 
the country for over 1,000 years. The most popular 
expression of Islam has been the traditionally 
apolitical Shafi branch of Sunni Islam which includes 
the veneration of Saints – as well as the ancestors of 
Somali clans.37 One of Italy’s colonial administrative 
strategies was to manipulate cultural and religious 
identities between the Muslim Somalis and the 
Christian Ethiopians.38 This dynamic is particularly 
illustrated through Italy’s annexation of the semi-
desert area of Ogaden - from Ethiopia to Somalia – 
the same area that would later fuel Pan-Somalism, 
aggravate an undeclared war, and intensify 
tensions between the two countries. Although clan 
affiliation briefly diminished in favor of a unified Pan 
Somali vision to thwart Italy’s colonial governance, 
it re-emerged again as the primary form of 
association alongside a more fundamentalist form 
of Islam in the 1980s. During this same time period, 
Somalia’s neighboring countries, Kenya, Ethiopia, 
and Djibouti began providing various forms of 
assistance to different warring clan factions.39 
The three factors of strong clan affiliation, Islamic 
fundamentalism, and foreign aid created a potent 
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backdrop for President Barre’s evolving repressive 
regime. 
General Barre had stepped onto Somalia’s political 
stage in the middle of the Cold War. The general, 
a member of the Marehan Darod sub-clan near 
Ogaden, organized a coup and overthrew the 
democratically elected government of the Somali 
Youth League in 1969. During the proxy wars of the 
Cold War, global security and ideology were taking 
precedence over human rights concerns. Public 
will was often traded for increasingly ineffective 
and unpopular governments. Such was the case in 
Somalia. As the Cold War era progressed, Somalia’s 
geostrategic importance became significant. 
Barre’s administration began to reap the benefits 
from foreign aid funneling into Mogadishu, first 
from the Soviets, and then by the United States 
as well as Saudi Arabia. Flush with petro-dollars, 
Saudi Arabia’s bi-lateral aid was meant to challenge 
the influence of the Soviet Union.40 Monies were 
provided to build and fund Madrasas and to 
provide educational scholarships for Somali youth. 
The toxicity of these paradoxically motivated flows 
of aid into Somali society would first become 
apparent with the disastrous invasion of Ethiopia’s 
Ogaden region in 1977. No other event so singularly 
illustrates how the forces of global security agendas 
can precariously politicize humanitarian aid. 
The Ogaden War (1977-1978) created 400,000-
800,000 refugees (comprised mainly of Somali 
Ethiopians from all clans inside Somalia41), and drew 
an influx of Western aid and workers to service 
these camps for the next eleven years. The presence 
of international NGOs soon became a source of 
lucrative funds for the government in Mogadishu 
with officials acting as intermediaries between the 
NGOs and refugees.42 They diverted much of the 
aid, while simultaneously inflating the number of 
displaced people to increase supplies and then 
expelling any foreign dignitaries or expatriates 
who challenged the state’s position. Clan leaders 
were equally shrewd. They began to capitalize off 
the foreign financial aid pouring into the country 
and eventually used it to fight against President 
Barre’s despotic government and to ultimately 
overthrow his regime. With the ousting of Barre’s 
forces from Ogaden by the Soviets in 1978, Somalia 
slowly descended into civil war as disgruntled clans 
begin to oppose an increasingly violent central 
government stacked with Barre’s Marehan Darod 
clan.43 Utilizing a state war economy, the Barre 
regime had turned refugee sites into de-facto 
training camps and humanitarian aid into logistical 
support, recruiting many of the refugees to fight up 
north in the occupation of northwestern Somalia 
in what is today called Somalialand. Despite the 
international aid community's awareness of these 
violations, no actions were taken to suspend aid to 
the refugee camps as Somalia was still an important 
and strategic Cold War ally.
Pilfering of foreign aid continued as the country 
descended further into civil turmoil, culminating in 
the 1991 famine and the dissolution of the Somali 
Democratic Republic. When Barre’s regime finally 
fell, international humanitarian organizations were 
confronted with a war economy that was no longer 
orchestrated by the government in Mogadishu, but 
by local clans and militia. While NGO personnel 
were not harmed, rebels began to target their 
vehicles, housing, and the food supplies meant 
for the camps. After decades of internal conflicts 
and disaster, humanitarian aid was one of the 
only sources of reliable revenue for them. They 
felt entitled to the aid of agencies that operated 
in their areas. Aid workers were frequently 
forced to purchase protection from local militia 
to pursue their work, in what became known as 
“technical assistance.”44  The initiation of the first 
UNITAF mission in 1992 (Operation Restore Hope), 
briefly brought greater security to aid personnel 
but ultimately this international intervention 
changed the nature of the security dynamic and 
agenda in Somalia. Within five months, UNITAF 
had transitioned into UNOSOM whose mandate 
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had moved from one of humanitarian support 
to securitization of the escalating civil war. Their 
directive was to re-establish a central state and 
arrest local warlords. The effect of this action 
resulted in such an escalation of violence that 
the United States ultimately exited the mission in 
the aftermath of the Black Hawk Down incident. 
The neutrality and security of humanitarian aid 
workers was compromised by these events, forcing 
NGOs to eventually relocate their headquarters 
and international staff to the safety of Nairobi; a 
situation that has largely persisted to this day. 
A retreat of the international community and aid 
organizations from Somalia has strengthened 
clan affiliation as people sought security through 
alternative networks. In fact, the constitutions 
of Somaliland and Puntland were negotiated 
in conjunction with clan leaders to ensure a 
consensus.45 However, while clans have brought 
stability to some local areas through traditional 
conflict resolution methods such as blood-
money, they have been unable to curb the activity 
or influence of terrorist groups. Additionally, 
because the international community has been so 
fixated on establishing a centralized government 
in Mogadishu, it has been unable to effectively 
counter both the recruitment and activities of 
terrorist groups in Somalia, particularly those with 
a clan affiliation.46 The internationally supported 
Transitional Federal Government was deeply 
unpopular and ineffective in the country in this 
regard. Although the Union of Islamic Courts 
(UIC) was rejected by the international community 
because of its fundamentalist links, it had enjoyed 
widespread support among the clans and brought 
a level of stability and rule in 2006 to South Central 
Somalia that had not been achieved for years. 
The securitization of aid that followed in the 
aftermath of the UNOSOM missions and the 
post-9/11 global context has compromised the 
independence and efficiency of aid, leading to 
further deterioration on the ground.47 The Horn of 
Africa has received much scrutiny and international 
coordination in relation to the security concerns 
instigated by the growing activities of pirates, and 
continued terrorism activities. Out of this concern 
for security, Ethiopia engaged a military intervention 
in Somali against the “Jihadists” and UIC in 2006.48 
This disastrous action deteriorated security even 
further, leading to increased refugee flows into 
Kenya, thus precipitating conditions that ultimately 
led to the 2011 famine. Additionally, a number of 
attacks on Western aid agencies and citizens in 
Somalia have created a heightened culture of 
security-risk aversion among traditional donors 
over the years. As a result, security has become 
the defining criteria for aid distribution, placing the 
safety of NGO personnel above humanitarian and 
development efforts. This imposition of security 
conditions on aid sends a clear message that the 
safety of international aid agencies is prioritized 
over the needs of the populace.49 Based in Nairobi, 
international aid agencies have been forced to rely 
on local contractors in Somalia to deliver aid, many 
of whom benefit from the continuance of the very 
conditions that attract humanitarian assistance.
At an inter-state level, anti-terror laws are 
exacerbating the internal dynamics in Somalia and 
the efficiency of humanitarian aid projects.50 In 
the pursuit of global security, traditional donors 
such as the United States, Australia, and Britain, 
all adhere to national anti-terrorism legislation 
that criminalizes any transfer of resources to a 
suspected terrorist organization or associates51. 
Such legislation also limits the autonomy of 
associated NGOs by inserting clauses into funding 
agreements and procedures or through legislation 
governing NGO conduct. A number of British NGOs 
working in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia organizations 
in the Gaza Strip, have had their funding cut due 
to such agreements. In 2009, the US government 
withheld new food assistance deliveries to aid 
agencies pending a review of the legality of their 
operations in Somalia in response to Al-Shaabab’s 
| 9
F E B R U A R Y  2 0 1 4  |   I P C - M E R C AT O R  P O L I C Y  B R I E F
designation as a terrorist organization the year 
before. Since that time, three American NGOs have 
terminated activities in the country and overall aid 
fell to 88 percent.52 60 percent of the 3.5 million 
Somalis that required humanitarian aid in 2009 
were in areas controlled by Al-Shaabab.53
The complex mosaic of clans and identities in 
Somalia has been essential to Somali survival, but 
it is also a system that has been exacerbated by 
aid securitization over the years. The territory of 
Somalia has been ravaged by decades of conflict, 
leaving the economy and infrastructure of the 
country emaciated. The economy of Puntland, 
an autonomous region since 1998, is almost 
completely dependent on the revenue generated 
from the piracy conducted off its coast.54 The 
economies of Somaliland and Somalia consist of 
agriculture, a black market economy driven largely 
by humanitarian aid and piracy, and the remittances 
of the large international Somali diaspora.55 Anti-
terrorism laws and the securitization of aid limit 
the flexibility and security of humanitarian and 
development efforts. In a country as complex and 
fragile as Somalia, the association between civilians 
and members of undesirable organizations such 
as Al-Shaabab or Hizb-al-Islam is often due to the 
necessity of survival and the kinship of clans. In such 
a situation, efforts to penalize a few have affected 
entire regions. Aid has become politicized by those 
who are allowed or not allowed to receive it, and 
the providers of assistance have become tainted 
by their bias and a history of failed international 
interventions in Somalia. 
Turkey’s Development Initiatives in Somalia
As a majority Muslim state that is emboldened with 
Western institutions and a pluralistic democratic 
constitution, Turkey has created a hybrid model 
of development that reflects its own unique global 
positioning. Although the “West” is at the very 
genesis of Turkey’s modern political identity, the 
relational and historical threads of the Ottoman era 
reach far to its east, north, and south, too. The built-in 
ambiguity or flexibility in this distinctiveness offers 
Turkey a unique locus. It can tilt comfortably in a 
variety of directions depending upon the specific 
concerns and needs of any global challenge. Within 
this nimble positioning there is generous latitude 
for the country to adapt to the growing edge of 
most regional and/or international demands. 
Turkey believes the combination of its geostrategic 
location, a booming economy, the ability to 
understand different social and cultural dynamics 
within the region, and its foreign policy values bring 
a unique perspective and shape to development 
assistance. These distinctions also set it apart from 
the frameworks of traditional Western donors.
Foundational foreign policy principles such as 
multi-dimensional diplomacy, zero problems 
with neighbors, cooperation, win-win strategies, 
defending democratic values, and demanding a 
just international order infuse the ethics of Turkey’s 
humanitarian and development practices. Its leaders 
have consistently refused coercive methods for 
international conflict resolution engagement and, 
instead, promote proactive diplomacy and dialogue 
between all parties. In addition, Turkey tends to 
prioritize bilateral and direct engagement over 
multilateral development efforts. Another hallmark 
of Turkey’s development framework that may be 
unique from the “West” is the emphasis it places 
on strengthening the economic integration within 
its region in order to enhance interdependence. 
While economic initiatives may illustrate Turkey’s 
liberal approach to international cooperation and 
institutionalization, this priority also demonstrates 
a raised consciousness about the relationship 
between violence, poverty, and political instability. 
Highlighting efforts in Somalia, for example, 
underlines Turkey’s focus upon a participatory and 
comprehensive approach to economic and social 
development. Providing the means and support for 
infrastructure development is both complimentary 
and necessary to stabilize Somalia’s transition. 
Turkey forecasts that strengthening the public 
and private sectors will ultimately contribute to 
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national cohesion. 
Turkey’s perspective on this strategy is pragmatic 
and essential for building sustained peace.56
Turkey considers soft power and confidence 
building strategies as a holistic approach to conflict 
intervention, peacebuilding, and development. 
These include strategies such as economic 
interdependence, high-level political dialogue, 
development/humanitarian assistance, cultural 
sensitivity based upon a shared history, and 
effective public diplomacy. It is the intentional 
combination of these strategies (along with a 
commitment to non-coercive intervention) that 
sets Turkey apart from the more dominant Western 
approach. Additionally, Turkey seems to be unique 
is in its explicit use of language – particularly 
around the meaning of “ethics” and its emphasis 
on working from an ethical paradigm. In the past 
year, there has been a sharp increase in rhetoric 
about “Turkey’s Ethical Framework” throughout 
diplomatic speeches and high level meetings. In his 
most current writings about involvement in conflict 
affected countries, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu 
has started to describe the “ethics” underpinning 
Turkey’s foreign policy framework as being sincere, 
honest, transparent, trustworthy, neutral, hopeful, 
inclusive, and sharing a common vision.57 President 
Gül has also stated that Turkey’s framework 
emphasizes human dignity and justice, serving as 
a unique and “virtuous power.”58 
Turkey’s entrance into the Somali conflict may 
have been a surprise to many, but it exemplifies 
the dynamic emphasis within its foreign policy. Its 
intervention into Somalia was based on a strong 
moral and ethical belief in the need to end the 
effects of the famine and the cycles of conflict that 
were perpetuating Somali suffering.59 Not only was 
a strong sense of ethical obligation a driving force 
behind Turkey’s involvement, but so was its sense 
of duty that the international community shares 
a responsibility and obligation to assist in solving 
conflicts. Humanitarian crises and war are a result 
of much broader regional and global dynamics, 
and regional neighbors are neither immune nor 
impervious to the impact of instability and violence. 
Turkey’s perspective on the causes of human 
suffering has emerged from the recognition of the 
challenging and global nature of conflicts facing 
many states today – and particularly within its own 
neighborhood. It is because of such an environment 
that Turkey’s foreign policy and development 
efforts embrace a proactive and multidimensional 
approach to meet those challenges. The country 
relies on its soft power strength, particularly in 
the areas of mediation, religious-based cultural 
affiliation, and bilateral development relations. 
All three mechanisms are leveraged to generate 
sustainable partnerships throughout the region.60 
They are also the same principles and mechanisms 
that form the basis for Turkey’s engagement in 
Somalia. 
As an emerging donor in the global arena, Turkey’s 
development vision found full expression in 
Somalia as its efforts there reflect a commitment 
to mediation, social justice, and peacebuilding. 
Free of aid conditionality, Turkey emphasizes a 
mutually beneficial and sustainable partnership 
between donor and recipients through civil 
capacity building measures which focus on cultural 
association and the equal and direct engagement 
with locals. Due to security concerns, traditional 
development aid to fragile states has often 
stagnated with such donors increasingly faced 
with questions about their agendas and motives. 
It is within this context that Turkey’s role has been 
evolving. Turkey entered into the Somali context 
without the encumbrances that currently plague 
international donors. Yet Turkey’s leaders have 
remained particularly critical of the international 
community’s ineffectiveness during the devastating 
2011 famine and its failure to achieve justice and 
stability in Somalia.61 They have called upon the 
global community to return to the courageous 
development aid practices of the past and to offer 
more ethically and morally responsible assistance 
in the future.
When Turkish NGOs and officials began working in 
Somalia, efforts were initially framed as emergency 
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humanitarian assistance in specific response to the 
famine in 2011. Aid assistance and humanitarian 
workers were devoted to the alleviation of human 
suffering through short term material relief 
and services, emergency food aid, and relief 
coordination. Public and private harmonization 
and coordination was at its highest in the summer 
of 2011. A widespread campaign in Turkey, led by 
NGOs such as Kimse Yok Mu (KYM) and Human 
Relief Foundation (IHH), made a considerable 
contribution in finding substantial resources and 
support for relief efforts.62 However, these activities 
quickly transformed into broader programs to 
address the fundamental structural deficit in the 
country that is sustaining conflict.63 Reflecting the 
country’s commitment and approach to Somalia, 
Turkey appointed Kani Torun, a humanitarian 
activist and former general coordinator for Doctors 
World Wide (YDD), to oversee its efforts. 
Turkey’s Somali aid program can be separated 
into five pillars: humanitarian aid, economic 
development, infrastructure, political assistance, 
and security sector reform.64 
The goal of this comprehensive strategy is the 
protection of all Somalis within a functioning state; 
Mogadishu in particular needs capacity building 
in order to achieve this end. Currently, there is 
no state system or coordinating infrastructure 
through which Turkey’s civilian assistance can be 
accepted, organized, or disseminated. At the same 
time, public trust remains low. There is a critical 
need to bolster sentiment for Somalia’s national 
unity and to encourage a collective vision for a 
functioning state. Turkey’s development reforms 
include finding ways to address public opinion 
through various civil society building measures. 
Described in Turkey’s foreign policy goals as “global 
development diplomacy efforts,” or “development 
cooperation efforts,” civilian capacity building 
programs – such as strengthening infrastructure 
and encouraging civil society engagement – have 
become the basis of Turkish development efforts 
in Somalia.65 
The emphasis on civilian capacity building reflects 
Turkey's increasing use of its soft power resources 
over traditional military based mechanisms.66 Key 
technical assistance programs include infrastructure 
reform such as building roads, schools, health 
clinics, and civilian capacity building measures 
through training of municipality works67, training 
of Imams68,  and increasing the civilian capacity 
of the Central Bank of Somalia.69 Turkey’s multi-
faceted approach includes the parallel use of both 
humanitarian association and development aid, 
and encompasses collaboration with a number of 
private NGOs initiatives such as agricultural training 
and water sanitation. Turkish NGO YYD (Doctors 
Without Borders) is a significant partner to the 
country’s development framework and reflects this 
fusion of aid efforts. YYD began its initial assistance 
to Somalia by providing humanitarian relief in 2010. 
They now have longer-term projects that combine 
technical assistance and civilian capacity building. 
For example, they helped build Sifa Hospital in 
Mogadishu to revitalize a healthcare system that 
had been destroyed by the civil war and foreign 
interventions. Currently, they are strengthening 
the capacity of Somali medical workers by training 
them at Turkey’s Bezmialem Trust University 
Hospital. These workers continue receiving support 
through regular rotations by visiting YDD doctors 
at Sifa. YDD is now in the process of transitioning 
the hospital to the care of Somalia’s Ministry of 
Health.70 YDD also established medical nutrition 
centers in several regions through Somalia. 
Working in cooperation with UNICEF, nutritional 
experts supply curative food and medical formula 
for mothers and their infants.
Mediation is a flagship of Turkish foreign diplomacy 
and another example of its soft power. 
Efforts at facilitating dialogue are indivisible 
from Turkey’s framework of development which 
incorporates the support of peacebuilding and 
statebuilding. A central aspect Turkey’s conflict-
sensitive method is engagement and dialogue 
with all parties to a conflict. Through its various 
development initiatives, Turkey has sought to 
become a trusted partner and mediator in Somalia. 
At the intra-state level, Turkey supports national 
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reconciliation and the preservation of territorial 
integrity of all Somalia. Leaders have encouraged 
the facilitation of talks between Somaliland and 
South Central.71 Because of the fractured system 
and loyalties in Somalia, mediation and dialogue 
are the primary means through which Turkish 
NGOs and ministries conduct their aid programs. 
Although State efforts are generally suspected of 
political agendas, Turkey has intentionally worked 
to maintain humanitarianism’s creed of neutrality 
as a core operating principle.72 This necessitates 
the perception of impartial engagement with 
all actors. Fostering interpersonal dialogue and 
engagement with local actors through the delivery 
of direct aid is one aspect of this balancing act. 
Turkey has been working through TIKA to open up 
development offices in Puntland and Baydhabo. 
Depending upon the security situation, Turkey has 
additionally received permission from Somaliland 
to open a General Consul in the region. These 
efforts reflect Turkey’s genuine commitment to 
partnering throughout the wider territories of 
Somalia. Turkish state officials are very aware of 
appearing prejudiced towards Mogadishu, and 
have actively pursued engagement with other 
regions in the country from Somaliland to Kismayo 
in South Central Somalia.73
IHH, one of the largest Turkish NGOs, provides 
another example of conflict-sensitive approaches 
to development among Turkish private actors. 
Since 1997, they have actively engaged with several 
local clans through collaborative efforts with Somali 
NGO Zamzam.74 IHH seeks to develop partnerships 
that are undergirded by strong communication 
with the local leadership and communities. 
They stress neutrality towards civil disputes and 
emphasize their support for all of Somalia. Their 
long-standing relationship with Zamzam is why 
IHH Deputy President Hüseyin Oruç believes they 
are perceived as unbiased actors in the country; 
free from holding a security agenda.75 Facilitating 
dialogue between communities is an underlying 
goal in İHH’s framework and is exhibited through 
programs such as educational and agricultural 
training workshops in which people are drawn 
from all over the country. 
The key aspect of Turkey’s ambitious development 
framework is the direct delivery of aid between 
the government and Turkish NGOs to local Somali 
communities. TIKA estimates that there are less 
than 200 Turkish nationals in Somalia as of 2013.76 
Despite the low numbers of Turkish aid workers, 
quick and effective aid delivery has continued 
unabated. Regional Somali Ministries have praised 
the method of direct aid delivery because it has 
empowered and engendered confidence in the 
local populace by signaling that they can be trusted 
as equal partners.77 The result of this direct aid has 
also been visible through significant infrastructure 
changes such as paved roads, disposal services, and 
clean water services.78 The efficient delivery of aid 
is something that is highly valued among Turkish 
personnel79 and is a differentiating characteristic of 
Turkish development approach compared to other 
actors. While Turkey’s level of ODA may be more 
limited than that of larger donors, its method of 
aid provision results in lower operating costs that 
produce higher aid yields.80 Other international 
donors base themselves in Nairobi or in the heavily 
guarded Anisom base in Mogadishu81 and rely on 
local but impersonal channels to send aid. But the 
cost of delivering humanitarian aid is therefore 
higher due to corruption, security expenditures, 
and other running costs. The direct delivery of aid 
by officials not only provides more assistance, it 
also promotes mutual trust, a personalized manner 
of aid delivery82, and increases Turkey’s sphere of 
influence. 
In contrast to many traditional donors, Turkey does 
not attach conditionality to its assistance because 
such aid often fosters resentment and stifles the 
kind of sustainable statebuilding that donors hope 
to support.83 
An increasing number of States have begun to 
prefer engagement with Non-DAC members 
because of this issue which has created a unique 
opening for emerging countries. While Turkey does 
not engage in ideological aid or conditionality, its 
pursuit and support for good governance initiatives 
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in Somalia, as part of its wider development agenda, 
represent a more equitable and empowering 
approach towards democratization than the 
coercive measure of political conditionality of aid. 
The controversial inclusion of 300 civil society 
groups in the second UN Istanbul conference on 
Somalia in June 2012 illustrates the Turkish state’s 
commitment to fostering national unity through 
engagement and dialogue. Challenging the 
reluctance of their Somali counterparts and the 
international community, Turkish officials stressed 
that “we want the international community to 
hear the voice of the grassroots organizations of 
Somalia."84 Also, Turkey's training programs for 
Somali civil servants and diplomats’ influences the 
creation of a culture of good governance.85 Similarly 
the state’s scholarship program for Somali youth 
represents an investment not only in the future 
leaders and entrepreneurs of the country, but also 
the bilateral relations between Somalia and Turkey. 
In 2011, almost 1,100 scholarships were provided 
for Somali students by Diyanet, KYM, and Helping 
Hands86, with a further 440 students studying in 
Turkey in 2013.87 
In the absence of aid conditionality, Turkey frames 
its relationship with Somalia in terms of a shared 
religious-cultural heritage. This has made some 
traditional donors nervous, especially as they 
witness an overall shift taking place in Muslim 
countries’ donor activities.88 But this is yet another 
example of Turkey extending a traditional tool of 
soft power. Turkey supports cultural projects and 
the study of Turkish language through both its 
scholarship programs and the opening of a Turkish 
Culture Center in Mogadishu.89 The acceptance 
of Turkish State agencies and NGOs by locals has 
been aided by highlighting their religious affinities. 
The framing of their relationship and presence 
in Somalia in terms of shared religious heritage 
helps to facilitate the ability of public and private 
Turkish organizations to successfully interact with 
local clans as legitimate and non-threatening 
partners. This is a critical dimension of what 
separates Turkey’s efforts from traditional donor 
actors in Somalia.90 NGO workers have stated that 
“for the Turkish organizations it was much easier 
because we don't have a political agenda. We 
were not the occupier of Somalia. In addition we 
have another bridge between Somalia and Turkey; 
both are Islamic countries and people from the 
Islamic world have been accepted much more than 
Westerns.”91 A shared religious-cultural heritage 
has created a level of trust among most actors, 
with the exception of Al-Shaabab which considers 
Turkey too Western.92 
Turkey has developed considerable experience 
working in conflict countries such as Bosnia, 
Afghanistan, and Burma93, while also engaging in 
bilateral mediation between states such as Israel 
and Syria (2003,2007), and facilitating dialogue 
between Iran and the West over the former’s 
nuclear program.94 The values inherent in mediation 
such as a non-coercive and inclusive process guide 
Turkish NGO activities in Somalia. Embracing a 
multilateral approach, Turkish NGO actors support 
the process of national reconciliation at a local 
level through civilian capacity building programs. 
At the same time, Turkey’s governmental officials 
pursue intra-state Track One diplomacy through 
efforts which encourage the territorial integrity of 
Somalia. 
The provision of full Turkish scholarships for 
hundreds of Somali students is not only a significant 
investment in the future relations between the two 
countries but it is also a conflict-sensitive strategy 
by discouraging Somali youth from joining militant 
groups. The provision of scholarships to Somali 
youth targets the country’s largest demographic 
for militant recruitment and offers them a chance 
for an alternative future. This focus on Somali 
youth is also reflected in the numerous schools 
currently being built by TIKA, KYM, IHH, and the 
Gülen movement. Contrary to the Chinese who 
have been widely criticized for importing labor95, 
Turkey invests heavily in local capacity through 
training programs and it creates local jobs with 
many Somali’s acting as translators, laborers and 
representatives for Turkish organizations farther 
afield.96 This has the dual effect of decreasing 
the cost of Turkish aid while simultaneously 
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empowering locals. However the continuing 
problem of a large population of unemployed 
youth is an issue that will require a multilateral 
approach by both the Somali government and the 
international community if national reconciliation is 
to be sustained.
While the success of Turkey's political strategy is 
ongoing, the “Turkish model”97  of providing direct 
aid to people on the ground and its extensive 
infrastructure projects has been praised for 
providing visible and tangible progress to local 
peoples. 
An interpersonal approach to local empowerment 
reflects their overall emphasis on peacebuilding. 
Turkey’s efforts during the 2011 famine illustrate 
that an emerging country can potentially make 
a more significant development impact than the 
better resourced BRICS and traditional donor 
states. They did so by identifying neglected 
development gaps that require assistance and by 
mobilizing both public and private organizations 
to work in tandem with governmental initiatives.98 
However, there still remain significant problems 
of overall coordination between TIKA, the Somali 
governments, and the numerous Turkish NGOs 
active on the ground.99 The flexibility and efficiency 
of aid delivery, which is a defining characteristic of 
Turkey’s approach, has meant that Turkish officials 
have sometimes bypassed the relevant state 
channels in their enthusiasm, undermining the 
very statebuilding they are hoping to support. This 
is a problem that TIKA has experienced in other 
developing countries.100 The problem of consistent 
coordination in Somalia is further problematized 
by the fragmented condition of Somali ministries, 
and reluctance on the part of Turkish officials 
to feed into the corruption that is endemic in 
the country. Given the amount of aid that is 
pouring into all parts of Somalia, Turkish officials 
recognize the serious need for better coordination. 
Currently, an inter-Ministerial Committee is drafting 
Turkey’s development strategy in consultation 
with several civil society actors and the UNDP. 
Turkey’s development coordination offices in any 
country are essential for its effectiveness. As the 
implementing agency of various Ministry programs, 
TIKA is the most important supporting mechanism 
for NGOs working in the field. Yet officials have 
acknowledged that there must be more enhanced 
regulations and strategies to direct the multiple 
Turkish institutions that work through TIKA and 
their relationship with civil society in general.101 
The need for regulation and coordination within all 
conflict-affected states is also of key concern but 
Turkish officials are trying to balance their desire 
for stronger institutional mechanisms with the NGO 
communities’ insistence to retain independence. 
The process of clarifying and institutionalizing 
Turkey’s development model is ongoing. Their 
approach to every development effort differs and 
they design unique programs for each particular 
country.102 Turkey is now cautiously attempting to 
institutionalize long-term approaches to conflict 
and fragile states. However Turkey is wary of the 
bureaucracy and binding regulations of traditional 
donors which it feels stifles the creativity of 
programs and may hinder flexibility and efficiency 
in responding to problems. Although not a member 
of the DAC, Turkey is an observer and is reporting 
its ODA figures to the Secretariat.103 Since 2005, 
the DAC has dropped the perquisite that members 
stop receiving ODA to join. This policy change 
has opened the opportunity for emerging states 
to more fully embrace international development 
efforts without damaging their domestic agendas. 
Yet Turkey is attempting to formalize a unique 
development framework without external 
influences104 thereby avoiding the pitfalls and 
enforcement mechanisms of more established 
donors. This decision may account for why TIKA 
has been accused of distancing itself from other 
international organizations and forums in the past 
few years such as Busan 2011.105 Coordination and 
isolation are also two complaints regularly leveled 
at Turkey by other international actors, in particular 
in relation to Somalia.106 Coordination among the 
international community is essential to establishing 
sustainable statebuilding in Somalia and in 
fighting a culture of patronage.107 In response to 
such criticisms, Turkish officials have consistently 
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emphasized their willingness to communicate 
directly with international actors who are on the 
ground in Mogadishu. Reflecting a concern of 
falling into the traditional donor pattern of the 
securitization of development, Turkish officials 
insist that any development agenda for Somalia is 
discussed within the country and among its various 
leaders.  
To Somalis, the continued visibility and presence of 
Turkish citizens in Mogadishu since the ousting of 
Al-Shaabab in July 2011 has been one of the most 
striking and endearing aspects of the country’s 
approach. It has changed the stigma of the country 
as a “no-go zone and raised questions over the 
country’s isolation for two decades.”108 Turks have 
enjoyed unprecedented security in a country noted 
for its hostility to foreigners and even from the 
punitive activities of Al-Shaabab which views them 
as Westernized Muslims.109 This has been attributed 
primarily to Turkey’s willingness to live and work 
alongside the local population and the level of 
respect that they exhibit towards Somalis. Despite 
the presence of many Turkish citizens in Mogadishu 
for nearly two years, there were no attacks on 
them until April and July 2013. The Al-Shaabab 
attacks killed three Turkish workers for Kizilay,110 a 
member of the Turkish embassy111 the head of YYD 
operations in Somalia and a native Somali.112 In its 
cooperation with conflict-affected states, Turkey 
wrestles with finding the fragile balance between 
respect for state sovereignty and international 
community’s response and responsibility towards 
state-sponsored or rebel violence against citizens. 
This challenge will likely be an ongoing juggle 
with bilateral efforts in Somalia. In the aftermath 
of these recent attacks, Turkish officials have 
reiterated their commitment to the Somali people 
and their presence on the ground. There will be 
increased security around personnel and citizens 
in Mogadishu but it has been emphasized that this 
will not stop the activities of Turkish workers.113 
Projects will continue and expand to other parts 
of the country, such as the General Consul in 
Somaliland as Turkey pursues its development 
vision with Somalis. 
Turkey’s development approach to Somalia 
reflects its soft power-attributes and status as 
an emerging donor. Its multilateral development 
initiatives span the humanitarian and development 
arena while simultaneous political efforts are 
being pursued to forge a united Somali system 
that has support from regional governments and 
civil society actors.
The importance of mediation and conflict-
sensitivity is apparent in Turkish ministries’ and NGO 
initiatives that pursue multilateral and capacity-
based development projects that are primarily 
aimed at alleviating humanitarian suffering and 
empowering locals. While traditional donors 
employ the discourse of democratization, the use 
of historical and religious rhetoric by Turkish actors 
has served to legitimize Turkey’s presence in the 
country as a non-threatening actor that can serve 
as an alternative role model to the developing 
nation. The presence of Turkish citizens on the 
ground in Mogadishu has only served to reinforce 
this perception. However Turkey’s preoccupation in 
distinguishing itself from the tainted practices of 
other donors has prevented it from fully engaging 
and communicating with other international donors 
in Somalia. This limits the success and extent of its 
multilateral projects in a country driven by complex 
clan and kinship alliances that have extensive 
experience in playing donors against one another. 
Despite Turkey’s awareness of these conflict-
dynamics it still risks being perceived as biased 
by its almost exclusive presence in Mogadishu 
due to the continuing security problems in the 
surrounding region. Turkey’s development vision in 
Somalia, which emphasizes a moral imperative in 
humanitarian activities, offers a refreshing approach 
to a stagnate conflict but one that cannot be fully 
achieved without addressing internal institutional 
issues and engaging with all international actors.
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Development Discussion
Development is a contested term. Many debates 
surround the meaning of development and 
arguments about “best practices” abound. 
Traditional donors and Western powers have tended 
to understand development as synonymous with 
economic growth and modernity. Unfortunately, 
vestiges of the colonial mindset have been 
woven this into post-WWII framework and have 
continued to shape many contemporary practices. 
For example, the Eurocentric idea of “trusteeship” 
or that those already “developed” can and 
should act on behalf of others “less developed” 
brought much definition, if not permission, for 
States to pursue their “vital interests” under the 
cloak of humanitarianism. Post-development 
theorists have long argued against this particular 
expression of the contemporary development 
enterprise, emphasizing the destructive power 
within intervention strategies and attempts at 
transforming non-Western societies. Development, 
for some, has now become a ‘toxic’ word because 
it has torn apart the bonds of natural and human 
communities. Too often, according to Rist (1997)116, 
development has become a discourse that simply 
legitimates the global expansionism of capitalism 
and the ability of external state actors to pursue 
their goals. 
Many communities in the world have benefited 
from traditional donor development engagement. 
Other communities have been stymied or 
debilitated by poor development efforts. In 
particular several states, most arguably the Least 
Developed Countries and fragile states – have been 
recalcitrant to many initiatives. 
Analysis of what currently constitutes the assumed 
standard for “good” development is warranted. Yet 
research and practitioners’ experiences indicate 
that emergent conflict sensitive frameworks do 
offer more thoughtful analysis and considerations 
for the complexities of working within conflict-
affected States. 
While “conflict sensitive frameworks” may be the 
new development “buzz” word, there is clear merit 
in understanding the dynamic interplay of system-
wide actors, historical strains, power differentials, 
religious ideologies, ethnic differentiations, 
and root causes of tensions, prior to instituting 
development practices in a conflict-affected 
community. Additionally, utilizing a Theories of 
Change approach can also be a critical resource for 
analyzing reactivity within systems – particularly 
the cause and effects of development initiatives. 
Even though many humanitarian and relief actors 
maintain their impartiality, what they “do” never 
remains neutral. Due to this inevitable bias, ethical 
considerations and frameworks must be in place 
to guide even the most sensitized and astute 
development practitioner.
As middle income states begin to emerge onto the 
development scene, it will be especially important 
for them to be cognizant of historical patterns and 
ways their own conceptualizations of development 
are influenced by the dominant international 
paradigm. Given their own histories of being donor 
recipients, emerging state actors may hold acute 
sensitivity to traditional hegemonic practices 
and seek alternative modalities such as bilateral 
projects and non-conditional aid. But if they are 
not careful, emerging donor actors may actually 
perpetuate historical modalities from the West. Our 
analysis indicates that Turkey’s evolving framework 
in Somalia is fluctuating between the poles of this 
broad continuum as its leaders continue to define 
what constitutes “best” development practices. 
As Turkey seeks to differentiate its practices in 
this post-development era, we encourage them to 
remain mindful of lessons from the past. They have 
much to learn from traditional donor successes as 
well as from the mistakes these actors made along 
the way. By adopting sensitivities from some of the 
best tried or failed practices of some traditional 
donors Turkey would not be threatening its unique 
foreign policy vision or be giving into “hegemonic” 
standards.
| 1 7
F E B R U A R Y  2 0 1 4  |   I P C - M E R C AT O R  P O L I C Y  B R I E F
A strong “best” practice that has emerged 
off the battleground of over sixty decades of 
contemporary development is adopting a multi-
dimensional understanding of the relationship 
between poverty and development, in that 
underdevelopment can be a cause of conflict. 
Traditional donors have historically taken 
the position that when conflicts begin, their 
development initiatives go “on hold” and will only 
resume once the conflict has subsided. A limited 
perspective assumed that conflict generated mal-
development. This assumption was bolstered by 
the powerful theme within Western liberal thinking 
that modernization and development brought 
stability. What some theorists and practitioners 
now acknowledge is that globalization and liberal 
policies can actually antagonize or alienate 
local divisions. An infusion of capital into the 
hands of a minority, for example, may sharpen 
social stratification and stimulate violent social 
transformation. 
Economics are important, but it is simply 
not enough to spur financial growth. In fact, 
theorists such as Sen (1999)117, Seers (1979)118, and 
Goulet (1971)119 argue for a re-definition in our 
understanding of poverty and thereby economic 
and aid policies to states. While development must 
promote ‘life sustenance” such as food, clothing, 
health, and shelter – the quality of life is equally 
important. Dignity, freedom, access to education 
and literacy, national autonomy, and the ability to 
participate politically also contributes to improved 
and sustainable social conditions. People(s) do not 
just need a higher GNP. They need the ability to 
lead the kind of lives they value. Capacity-based 
theorists such as Sen (1999) maintain that the 
process of development matters as much as the 
outcome. As people’s capabilities – particularly 
their ability to access civil and political rights and 
governmental services – grow, their ability to help 
themselves and influence their lives will become 
enhanced. This type of framework ultimately 
promotes a development dialectic throughout 
the micro and macro levels. Turkey’s approach is 
capacity sensitive. Its aid practices are emboldened 
by an understanding of the importance of 
human dignity in development projects. Leaders 
utilize an integrated effort, one that promotes 
education and local empowerment alongside the 
construction of vital infrastructures. We encourage 
them to continue developing a multi-dimensional 
understanding of human and state development 
while also increasing its capacity through 
coordination with international and local actors. 
Aid, no matter how well-intentioned, is not neutral. 
Turkey would do well to continue assessing its 
practices and communicate its activities with other 
donors to avoid flooding areas with uncontrolled 
aid flows. If they are not prudent their current 
efforts in Somalia could actually exacerbate local 
tensions instead of appeasing them.
It takes shrewdness and courage to confront 
the politics of war/conflict economies. Turkey’s 
determination and dedication to step back 
inside an internationally abandoned Somalia is 
commendable. 
Violence remains deeply entrenched within and 
between communities which makes development 
itself a conflictual process. Strong development 
practice calls for careful reflection and awareness 
of the multiple social undercurrents in which it 
is embedded. Development actors are forced to 
make choices which are laden with attached social 
meanings such as class, literacy, ethnicity, gender, 
sect, clan, etc.120  Partnerships with NGOs, who 
are hired for transportation or translation, and 
collaborations with political gate keepers – all affect 
how locals perceive who development actors are, 
and whose interests they represent. Historically, 
the potential redistribution of power due to donor 
driven resources threatened the monopoly of some 
clans and led donors to either stay (by paying for 
protection from clans) or leaving (and forfeiting 
their political presence or humanitarian efforts). 
Turkey has thus far been successful at sidestepping 
these dynamics. However as they continue to 
expand development efforts in Somaliland and 
South Center Somalia it is likely they will face 
similar dilemmas. Thoughtful preparation and a 
sensitive strategy are needed. By recognizing the 
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potential tensions between underdevelopment, 
liberal policies, and the infusion of capital, Turkey’s 
development actors will become more mindful of 
power and positionality within Somali communities. 
Personnel will need to be culturally and politically 
astute as they analyze dynamics surrounding 
the economic transactions taking place. Somalis 
have played the development game a long time, 
and they know how to play it well. Turkey could 
increase its savvy by listening to the advice of 
international donors who learned this the hard way, 
and recognizing the near impossibility of rising 
above these dynamics. There are corrupt leaders 
in Somalia and without a demand for transparency 
and a high level of transparency, Turkey could 
easily fall prey to the same entanglements that 
beset the traditional development actors who have 
gone before them.
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